Lessons From Yesterday's Operations Short of War: Nicaragua and the Small Wars Manual

by LtCol Richard J. Macak, Jr.

Those who forget the past. . . . As the Defense Department struggles to keep pace with a changing world, this author suggests it may be time to look back at one of our previous experiences with low-intensity conflicts.

As the U.S. Armed Forces develop and refine their doctrine for the use of military resources in low-intensity conflicts and military operations other than war, they should carefully assess the "small wars"[1] experiences of Marine forces through the first three decades of this century. These earlier campaigns are important, not only for their doctrinal contributions, but also because of their resemblance to conflict today:

> wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.[2]

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Probably the most significant small war experience in Marine Corps history was the lengthy conflict in Nicaragua. Fortunately, we still have extensive published and unpublished firsthand accounts of that campaign. More fortunately, we have a complete manual of doctrinal statement and application—the *Small Wars Manual*—derived from that experience. Although the manual has remained unchanged since its second publication in 1940, it will nonetheless prove invaluable to U.S. planners. Let's look at the situation of the time, the Marine involvement, and the resulting publications.

During its 20-year military involvement in Nicaragua, which ended on 1 January 1933, the Marine Corps achieved State Department foreign policy objectives by stabilizing a country with a long history of political unrest and civil war. To do so, the Marines engaged in diverse and important missions promoting the internal stability of the Nicaraguan Government. For instance, they established neutral zones to protect American lives and property; they physically separated and disarmed warring political parties, thus ending the 1926-27 civil war; they successfully protected the election process ensuring free and impartial presidential elections in 1928 and 1932; and they organized and trained a nonpartisan national guard, known as the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, into an effective fighting force.[3] Just before withdrawal, the Marines completed a 6-year counterinsurgency campaign against Augusto C. Sandino that was important for its intellectual contribution to counterinsurgency doctrine.

The involvement's contributions to counterinsurgency doctrine are the result of the cumulative efforts of many Marine officers who served in the lengthy campaign. Through their thoughtful articles in the *Marine Corps Gazette* and *Naval Institute Proceedings*, they provided a sizable reservoir of personal experience in counterinsurgency operations. As an institution, the Marine Corps focused these experiences at its Schools Command in Quantico, VA. Other Marine authors expanded the knowledge on counterinsurgency warfare by publishing the *Small Wars Manual* detailing the lessons learned from conflicts such as the Nicaraguan campaign.[4]

Before examining the military involvement in detail, let's review the historical highlights of U.S. regional interests and Nicaraguan political alignments. By the 1920s, U.S. economic, political, and military interests had grown considerably in Central America, particularly in Nicaragua. For example, the American business community, searching for overseas markets, expanded into the region. Companies, such as the highly successful United Fruit Company,

established branches throughout Central America, and these became lucrative investments for U.S. businessmen.

Also, the U.S. Government naturally considered the area vital to its national security, particularly because of the Panama Canal and its retention of construction rights to a future canal through Nicaragua. Likewise, the United States was concerned that Mexico, as a result of its recent revolution, would begin spreading its form of bolshevism or communism southward into the Central American countries.[5]

In Nicaragua, Americans through their investments and influences controlled the key elements of the economy. Internally, Nicaragua was politically divided between two powerful factions. The Conservative and Liberal Parties ruled through separate family alliances that constantly feuded over power. Always suspicious of each other's motives, they turned political unrest into a way of life in Nicaragua. The party occupying the Presidential Palace could expect unlawful attempts by the opposition to gain power. Thus, the United States faced a paradox in Nicaragua. On the one hand, U.S. national interests in the area required a stable political environment to survive, one conducive to growth and prosperity; on the other hand, the Nicaraguan Government was powerless to provide such an environment.[6]

With that historical and political context, let's turn to the campaign itself. In late 1922, the United States approached the problem from a diplomatic standpoint. From 4 December 1922 through 7 February 1923, the United States sponsored a conference in Washington on Central American affairs in which it proposed ways to stabilize the area. Representatives from all five Central American countries attended. The conference concluded with the General Treaty of Peace and Amity signed by all parties establishing several agreements.

First, no country would recognize a government that came to power through a coup d'etat or revolution. Second, internal disputes would be submitted to an international board of arbitration. Third, no country would interfere in the internal affairs of another.[7] Finally, standing armies would be replaced by nonpartisan constabulary forces. Thus, the 1923 treaty provided a means to preserve law and order. It also granted a degree of legitimacy to constabularies already established, especially the ones constituted in Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1916 and 1917, respectively, during actions by U.S. naval forces.[8]

The first opportunity to apply the General Treaty of Peace and Amity occurred in October 1925, when a Conservative Party coup in Managua deposed the Liberal president and vice president. Invoking the treaty, the United States refused to recognize the new Conservative government, instead proposing a diplomatic solution that promised U.S. recognition to the party winning the 1928 presidential election. But this diplomatic initiative fell apart when Mexico, throughout the autumn of 1926, covertly supported the liberal cause by encouraging the ousted vice president to return to Nicaragua and claim power. A hotly contested civil war ensued.[9]

By now, the State Department realized that more aggressive policies were necessary to end the civil war.[10] As a result, beginning in December 1926, the State Department expanded the Marines' role and presence in Nicaragua. Thus, their involvement entered a new stage characterized by escalating intensity and diversity.

Since the State Department's initial concerns were with protecting American lives and property, the department directed the U.S. Navy to put landing parties ashore to safeguard these interests. Accordingly, on 23 December 1926 the USS *Denver* and USS *Cleveland* landed Marines and sailors at Puerto Cabezas on the east coast.[11] This naval contingent promptly established a neutral zone in a district containing American fruit, lumber, and mining companies. Generally, a neutral zone was an area in which combat would endanger American lives and property. The Marines established these zones where contending parties were incapable of guaranteeing the safety of life and property and when conflict appeared imminent. Thereafter, neutral zones became a standard practice for the Marines, recognized by both Liberal and Conservative factions.[12]

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Similarly, after initially landing in Corinto on the west coast, Marines and sailors from the USS *Galveston* arrived in Managua on 6 January 1927 and established themselves as the Legation Guard.[13] This force symbolized the U.S. commitment to stabilize Nicaragua. In fact, the Legation Guard was the vanguard for several other landing parties and the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 5th Marine Regiment. By 9 March 1927, when BGen Logan M. Feland arrived in Managua with his 2d Marine Brigade staff to take command of all naval forces ashore in western Nicaragua, the Marines totaled 2,000 men and possessed 6 aircraft from Observation Squadron–1 (VO–1M) for aerial reconnaissance of the opposing armies.[14]

By mid-March 1927, the Marines had placed themselves in key positions to protect American lives and property and to guard critical communications lines between major cities. On 1 February 1927, one Marine battalion garrisoned in Managua and took over its defense. The Corps opened railroad lines between the major cities of Corinto, Managua, and Granada by 13 February 1927, and on 12 March



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1927 occupied Matagalpa to keep lines of communications open with Managua. Also, all large ports on both coasts and the major cities in the interior contained Marine detachments and neutral zones.[15]

With the Marines in position, State Department officials thought the time was appropriate to initiate a diplomatic solution to the civil war. On 31 March 1927, President Calvin Coolidge appointed a former Secretary of War, Col Henry Stimson, as his personal representative to explore possible solutions to the political situation in Nicaragua. Meeting with both Nicaraguan parties on 4 May 1927 under a large blackthorn tree along the banks of the Tipitapa River, Col Stimson negotiated an end to the fighting. Realizing the unlikelihood of a military victory and obtaining assurances from the State Department that U.S. forces would remain in Nicaragua as a stabilizing force, each side agreed to a truce, disarmament, supervised elections, and the establishment of a nonpartisan constabulary.[16]

More importantly, while the negotiators finalized the details of the Treaty of Tipitapa, Marine detachments occupied positions between the Conservative and Liberal armies along the Tipitapa River. The Marines thus prevented any incidents from spoiling the diplomatic efforts underway. On 13 May 1927, however, Sandino, a general in the Liberal army, refused to abide by the treaty's terms and abruptly left the area with a small band of followers. On three separate occasions in the next few days, Marine patrols were fired upon.[17] Despite these encounters with Sandino's rebels, the Marines maintained the peace between the contending parties.

According to Col Stimson's scenario, the next step for the Marines entailed disarming the warring factions. Over 800 Marines comprising elements of the 5th and 11th Marine Regiments arrived in Corinto on 19, 21, and 22 May 1927 to assist with this task.[18] With the 5th Marine Regiment now manning the neutral zone along the river, the factions were disarmed—the Liberal forces turned in over 3,700 rifles and machineguns, the Conservatives over 11,000, and both sides left over 5.5 million rounds of ammunition.[19] Thus, the premature departure of Sandino's relatively small band became only a blemish on the disarmament process. Overall, the Marines had thus far successfully fulfilled State Department policy objectives.

With the civil war concluded and disarmament complete, the State Department focused on its pledge to supervise the forthcoming 1928 presidential election. Also looking ahead, the Marines realized that if they had any hope at all of effectively supervising this election they had to do two things. First, they had to transform the emerging Guardia Nacional into an effective force against the rising bandit threat. Second, they had to conduct an aggressive counterinsurgency campaign of their own to keep the bandits off balance until the election.

In accordance with the 1923 Treaty of General Peace and Amity and the Tipitapa Treaty, the United States and Nicaragua had agreed to establish a nonpartisan national constabulary. On 22 December 1927 both countries signed the "Agreement Between the United States and Nicaragua Establishing the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua." Marine officers and senior enlisted men were appointed by the President under an act of Congress to serve with the Guardia. Eventually these Marines would be replaced by Nicaraguans. Marine Col Elias R. Beadle was appointed as the chief of the guard. The Guardia now filled the void left by the disarmed political factions. And with the Marines as the Guardia's impartial leadership, both countries regarded this new force as the most effective guarantee of fair and free elections.[20]

Led by their Marine officers, Guardia detachments began a campaign against the rebels that totaled 510 engagements before the Marines withdrew.[21] Employing aggressive patrolling techniques, the Guardia forces constantly pursued Sandino, keeping his forces away from populated areas.

One of the most famous Guardia units during the Nicaraguan involvement was Company M (for Mobile), commanded by Capt Lewis B. Puller. A combat veteran with experience in counterinsurgency operations, Capt Puller became a continual thorn in Sandino's side. Rec-

ognizing the need for mobility and speed, Puller organized his patrols into two units rather than one larger unit in order to reduce the logistical load and number of pack mules per patrol.[22] In addition, by keeping one patrol at the base, he could respond quickly either to relieve the other patrol or to investigate other incidents in his area. Because of the stamina of the local mestizos he recruited into the Guardia, Puller could average 18 to 20 miles daily—stretching it some days to as many as 40 miles—to overtake rebel bands. He chose to travel on foot because horses not only drew fire but slowed progress since so little jungle forage was available for a fast-moving force. Mules, however, could feed on the foliage of felled trees after the company encamped.[23] The bandits used horses, thus had to rest them every third day, giving Puller an opportunity to close on them. In one instance, Puller chased a mounted rebel band of horse thieves for about a week before he overtook them near Malcate in the interior. For months after the capture, civilians came to Puller's headquarters in Jinotega to claim previously stolen animals and saddles.[24]

As a result of these successes, the State Department and Marine Corps recognized the value of and need for Guardia units such as Company M. Plans were made to organize eight additional companies. However, severe budget cuts forced by the worldwide depression prevented implementing this good idea.[25] Nonetheless, the Guardia had shown it was an effective force in the field. One reason was that the Nicaraguan guardsmen were intensely proud and excellent fighters. The guardsmen transferred their Conservative and Liberal Party loyalties to their Guardia units. Once trained, they exhibited a devotion to their Marine officers unequaled in previous Marine Corps constabulary experience. Deeds of bravery by guardsmen protecting the Marine officers were not uncommon and many earned the coveted wound chevron. In short, Guardia efficiency was directly attributable to the excellent rapport between Marine officers and Nicaraguan enlisted men.[26]

In addition to the Guardia, the 2d Marine Brigade conducted a similar counterinsurgency campaign, actively patrolling into the northern areas where the bandits crossed into Nicaragua. But while the Brigade's methods closely followed those of the Guardia, a whole new factor made possible by the Brigade's organic aircraft assets distinguished this campaign from any previous ones.[27]

Never before had combat and logistical air support been combined to augment a ground campaign. By mid-1928, Marine aircraft had conducted "84 attacks on bandit forces" and carried "more than 1,500 people (including casualties and sick) and 900,000 pounds. Accident rate zero."[28] Aviation also provided "aerial mapping, photography, meteorology, daily message and mail drops, and packages through the country.[29] Airpower continually came to the aid of Marine and Guardia ground forces. For instance, on 16 July 1927 in the town of Ocotal, a seemingly overwhelming bandit force of approximately 500 men threatened to overrun the detachment of 39 Marines and 47 Guardia. "In the first organized dive-bombing attack in history—long before the Nazi Luftwaffe was popularly credited with the innovation,"[30] a five-plane detachment from Managua routed the bandits with machinegun fire and bombs. The Marines and Guardia sustained only one killed and one wounded, respectively, while Sandino suffered his worst defeat of the rebellion, losing 300 of the estimated 400-500 bandits in the attack. From this disaster at Ocotal, rebel forces gained a healthy respect for Marine aircraft, often moving at night and avoiding open areas during the day.[31]

Another important aspect of the Brigade's campaign was the civic action program created to reduce bandit influence on the population. Both a road-building project and a local volunteer defense group whose members were called "civicos" constituted this innovative program.

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On 24 May 1929, the American Minister in Nicaragua initially proposed to the State Department the idea of the construction project with a "two-fold purpose: military necessity and employment."[32] Building through the rugged bandit territory would let government forces respond more rapidly to all parts of the area. In addition, the construction would offer steady jobs to the inhabitants, thereby eliminating the manpower source for the bandits. And the roads would economically boost the country because they would serve to move products to the marketplace more efficiently. But, although the project began in August 1929, the same funding shortage that had prevented forming more mobile companies halted construction a little over a year later.[33] Conceptually, however, this project offered a real solution to the bandit problem. Had it continued, Sandino would have been faced with a shrinking manpower base and thus may have come to terms with the Nicaraguan Government.

The other half of the program, the forming of the civicos, was a reaction to the financial realities of the day. With fewer funds available in 1930, the Nicaraguan Government was forced to reduce the size of the Guardia. To supplement, the Marines proposed urban defense groups to work closely with the local Guardia commander. The civicos were citizens organized and trained as an emergency auxiliary.[34] The forming of the civicos indicates just how well the Marines understood counterinsurgency warfare.

With the counterinsurgency campaigns well

underway, the State Department turned its attention to the upcoming 4 November 1928 presidential election. To supervise voter registration and balloting, Marines were detailed to each of the precincts throughout the country. The American Minister reported to the Secretary of State in an 11 October 1928 telegram that 35,000 more people registered to vote than in 1924 and that this was due to the Marines and Guardia. The Minister telegraphed:

> [They were able to] protect citizens from intimidation. Detachments were stationed in key positions in towns and on patrol duty on roads leading to booths throughout registration period Sep23-Oct7. . . . No cases of intimidation, other disturbances [were] reported at any of 352 precincts in Republic [and] conduct of 352 Marine enlisted men who served as chairmen at precincts [was] . . . highly commended by both political parties.[35]

The Minister was equally enthusiastic on election day when he telegraphed in short bullet style:

> Complete order, heavy early vote throughout Nicaragua. . . . polls opened 7 this morning with crowds of 100 to 300 waiting precincts in Managua and elsewhere. Final air reconnaissance overflew every precinct yesterday and reported large crowds moving over trails to precincts with as many as 200 to 300 arriving late afternoon to vote early today. . . . Heavy vote indicated Jinotega, Esteli, Segovia is considered proof banditry has been practically ended by Marine pacification program which has given peaceable citizens complete confidence in measure taken by Marines to prevent intimidation of voters.[36]

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The leading party newspapers appropriately summarized the Marines' efforts. The Conservative paper *La Prensa's* headlines read: "The American supervision has honorably observed its promise. The election Sunday was honest, tranquil, correct and honorable." the *El Comericio*, the leading Liberal paper, wrote: "The United States is vindicated before the world."[37] Before their withdrawal in 1933, the Marines would also supervise the 1930 local elections and another presidential election in 1932. Sandino would remain at large, but he would not prevent the Marines from bringing stability and democratic processes to the country.

Lessons Learned

Back home, the involvement served as a catalyst for intellectual development within the Corps. Primarily, it motivated many Marine officers to regularly submit their combat experiences for publication in the *Gazette* and *Proceedings*. These articles offered valuable insights into the realities of "small wars." In a May 1931 article in the *Gazette* entitled "An Introduction to the Tactics and Techniques of Small Wars," Maj Harold H. Utley noted that although the Marine Corps maintained many historical examples of small wars, "few real studies seem to have been made of them."[38] It would not be long, however, before the Marine Corps would be seriously analyzing all the evidence accumulated throughout the occupation.

By the mid-1920s, the Division of Operations and Training was frequently augmenting the pages of the *Gazette* with first-hand accounts of significant engagements, but the articles were merely compiled battlefield accounts rather than analysis and lessons learned. They dealt with subjects such as "Protection of American Interests" or "Combat Operations in Nicaragua." For instance, one article, presenting the after-action report of the Marine detachment's commanding officer at Ocotal, outlined Sandino's attack on the Marine and Guardia garrison there on 16 July 1927. The report also contained Sandino's attack order and a detailed map of the town. Even without discussion, by its detail and completeness the report gave the reader an insight into the tactics used by both sides.[39]

Even while articles continued regularly in the *Gazette* on subjects such as "Aircraft in Bush Warfare," "The Supply Service in Western Nicaragua," and "The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua," the Marine Corps began evaluating its formal school curriculum at Quantico.[40] In the *Gazette's* August 1934 issue, Maj Charles J. Miller highlighted the need to analyze the wealth of material collected thus far. He indicated that:

> This work would seem to devolve upon the schools to digest and place the material in presentable form for the guidance and instruction of all the officers of the Corps.[41]

He concluded by noting that "the subject as a whole has only received a cursory examination" and much more needed to be done to:

> furnish the students with a clear and complete picture of all the tasks, obligations, and responsibilities that may devolve on a Marine Corps expeditionary force when intervening as an occupation force.[42]

Quantico had increased its small wars instruction from 9 hours in 1924-25 to 19 hours by 1932. Possibly in response to Maj Miller's call to establish a systematic education in small wars techniques, the 1934-35 academic year featured 94 hours of instruction.[43]

Beyond this educational improvement, the Marine Corps continued its efforts to produce a manual distilling the Caribbean experience into established principles. Based upon the efforts of Maj Utley, a Nicaraguan veteran, and other small wars instructors at Quantico, the Marine Corps produced the first edition of the *Small Wars Manual* in 1935 and the final revision in 1940. They drew their material from published articles, small wars lesson plans, and Col C.E. Callwell's 1906 book entitled *Small Wars—Their Principles and Practice*, which contained guerrilla

warfare experiences from such places as Indochina, Cuba, Rhodesia, the Punjab frontier, the Sudan, the Philippines, and sub-Sahara Africa.[44]

Not surprisingly, the manual's blueprint for future counterinsurgency operations closely corresponded to past events in Nicaragua. In 428 pages, the authors provided:

> instruction for feeding and supplying troops, gathering intelligence, running a military government, patrolling in jungles, attacking houses, bombing and strafing villages, conducting river operations, and a variety of other specific activities.[45]

The manual addressed other facets of counterinsurgency warfare as well, such as the underlying causes of revolution, how to handle the host country's population, and rules of engagement.

Furthermore, the manual divided the process of military intervention into five phases. First, the Marines should begin a gradual buildup of forces ashore. Second, they should commence combat operations using neutral zones or patrolling techniques. Third, they should develop a nonpartisan constabulary force to assist the civic affairs projects and internal defense. The constabulary should take on an active role in counterguerrilla patrols. As the bandits are subdued, the Marines should withdraw to garrison the large cities. Fourth, the Marines should begin preparations for the supervision of free elections. Fifth, once elections are complete, the constabulary should take control as the Marines withdraw.[46] From this review of the manual's process of intervention, one can see how much of an impact the Nicaraguan campaign had on counterinsurgency doctrine. In short, the manual was a comprehensive and successful attempt to deduce the lessons learned from this vast amount of counterinsurgency experience.

Unfortunately, after 1940 the Marine Corps' first-hand experience with and schooled knowledge of small wars declined significantly due, in part, to the large-scale amphibious nature of World War II in the Pacific and the preoccupation with nuclear warfare in the 1950s. In fact, by as early as the 1946-47 academic year, the Marines deleted all small wars instruction from its curriculum at Quantico, although counterinsurgency classes were reintroduced 2 years later. In April 1950, LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr., bemoaned the loss of small-unit operations expertise in a *Gazette* article entitled "Small Wars—Vanishing Art?"[47] In another instance, a Marine officer preparing a 1960 study on counterinsurgency operations was not even familiar with the *Small Wars Manual's* existence.[48]

Despite this decline in small wars emphasis, the Corps still retained a strong tie to its counterinsurgency heritage. This link to its institutional past was apparent in the Marines' approach to combat operations in Vietnam. According to Sir Robert Thompson, the noted British expert on counterinsurgency warfare:

> Of all the United States forces the Marine Corps alone made a serious attempt to achieve permanent and lasting results in their tactical area of responsibility by seeking to protect the rural populations.[49]

By 1965, the Marines opted to use combined action platoons (CAPs) that operated within established hamlets (neutral zones) to protect the inhabitants from Viet Cong intimidation. A notional CAP consisted of 14 Marines, 1 Navy corpsman, and 34 paramilitary Popular Forces (PFs, i.e., constabularies). By rigorous day and night patrolling, the CAPs sought to destroy the insurgent infrastructure, protect the local populace, organize intelligence nets, and train the constabulary. Unfortunately, the Marine Corps Combined Action Program was not a high priority effort with Army leadership, which emphasized search and destroy operations. Ultimately, this lack of priority combined with personnel shortages restricted the use of CAPs despite their promising accomplishments.[50]

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A more complete analysis of the concepts employed by the Army and Marine Corps in Vietnam lies beyond the scope of this study. However, the important point remains that although the *Small Wars Manual* is now almost 50 years old, it holds much to discover, thanks to its notable depth and range. And at a time of increasing likelihood of U.S. military involvement in operations much like the aging campaign in Nicaragua, the manual takes on even greater importance.

US MC

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Notes

1. *Small Wars Manual*, United States Marine Corps, 1940 (Government Printing Office, Washington, DC), p. 1. The Manual recognized the wide variety of military operations the term "small wars" implied by indicating that "small wars vary in degrees from simple demonstration operations to military intervention in the fullest sense, short of war."
2. Ibid.
3. Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: MacMillan, 1980), pp. 243-261.
4. Ibid., p. 263; Maj H.H. Utley, "An Introduction to the Tactics and Techniques of Small Wars," *Marine Corps Gazette*, May 1931, pp. 50-53.
5. A. Millett, p. 236; LtCol Clyde H. Metcalf, *A History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), p. 408; Neil Macaulay, *The Sandino Affair* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books), 1967, pp. 161-185.
6. Capt Evans F. Carlson, "The Guardia Nacional De Nicaragua," *Marine Corps Gazette*, XXI Aug 1937, p. 7; Millett, p. 239.
7. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927 (Washington, 1942), pp. 288-289 (hereinafter cited as Foreign Relations).
8. Marvin Goldwert, *The Constabulary in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962), p. 24.
9. Lester Langley, *The Banana Wars* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1982), pp. 184-188.
10. A. Millett, pp. 242-243.
11. Ibid., p. 243; "Summary of Operations in Nicaragua, December 23, 1926-February 5, 1928," Appendix, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: "Use of United States Navy in Nicaragua," February 11-18, 1928, 70th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1928), p. 2 (hereinafter cited as "Use of United States Navy in Nicaragua."
12. Metcalf, p. 418. For an indepth discussion on neutral zones, see *Small Wars Manual*, Chap. 5, Sec. 1, pp. 1-4.
13. Use of United States Navy in Nicaragua, p. 2.
14. Ibid., p. 3.
15. Ibid., p. 3; A. Millett, p. 244.
16. Henry Stimson, *American Foreign Policy in Nicaragua* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), pp. 42-84; Foreign Relations, pp. 351-353; United States Congress, Senate, Senate Document No. 288, 71st Cong. 30 Sess., Serial 9347, United States Marines in Nicaragua.
17. Use of United States Navy in Nicaragua, p. 3.
18. Ibid., p. 4.
19. Metcalf, pp. 422-23.
20. Agreement for the Establishment of the National Guard of Nicaragua, 22 December 1927, in Foreign Relations, 1927, III, pp. 434-439; Dana Munro, "The Establishment of Peace in Nicaragua," *Foreign Affairs*, XI (July 1933), p. 698.
21. Carlson, p. 7.
22. Robert D. Heinl, Jr., *Soldiers of the Sea: The U.S. Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1962), p. 284.
23. Burke Davis, *Marine! The Life of Chesty Puller* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962), p. 81.
24. Ibid., p. 62.
25. Richard Millett, *Guardians of the Dynasty* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1977), p. 93.
26. Langley, pp. 193-216; Neil Macaulay, pp. 161-185; Col H.S. Reisinger, "La Palabra del Gringo, Leadership of the Nicaraguan National Guard," *Naval Institute Proceedings*, LXI, 2 (February 1935), pp. 216-220.
27. Heinl, p. 289.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 290.
30. Capt. Kenneth A. Jennings, USAF, "Sandino Against the Marines," *Air University Review*, July-August 1986, XXXVII, pp. 86-88; Macaulay, p. 81.
31. Use of United States Navy in Nicaragua, p. 4; Jennings, p. 89.
32. Foreign Relations, 1929, III, pp. 567-570.
33. R. Millett, p. 91.
34. Ibid.
35. Foreign Relations, 1928, III pp. 507-509.
36. Ibid., pp. 513-514.
37. Ibid., p. 515.
38. Utley, pp. 50-53.
39. Division of Operations and Training, "Protection of American Interests," *Marine Corps Gazette*, 12 (Sep 1927), pp. 175-183; and "Combat Operations in Nicaragua,"*Marine Corps Gazette*, XIV (Mar 1929), pp. 16-30.
40. Maj Ross E. Rowell, "Aircraft in Bush Warfare," *Marine Corps Gazette*, XIV (Sept 1929), pp. 180-203; Maj Roger W. Peard, "Bull Cart Transportation in the Tropics," *Marine Corps Gazette*, XV (February 1931), pp. 29-49; Carlson, pp. 7-20.
41. Maj Charles J. Miller, "Marine Corps School 1934-1935," *Marine Corps Gazette*, XIX (August 1934), p. 58.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., p. 59.
44. Ronald Schaffer, "The 1940 Small Wars Manual and the Lessons of History," *Military Affairs*, Vol 36, 1972, p. 46; Col C.E. Callwell, *Small Wars—Their Principles and Practice* (3d ed., London, 1906).
45. Ibid., p. 47.
46. *Small Wars Manual*, pp. 5-9.
47. LtCol Robert D. Heinl, "Small Wars—Vanishing Art?," *Marine Corps Gazette*, XXXIV, April 1950, pp. 23-25.
48. Schaffer, pp. 49-50.
49. Maj Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., USA, *The Army and Vietnam* (The John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore and London, 1986), p. 172.
50. LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC(Ret), *First to Fight* (Naval Institute Press: Annapolis), pp. 179-195; Krepinevich, pp. 172-177.